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1. Introduction 
The Galileo navigation system introduced the integrity concept, intended as a continuous 
control of the information broadcasted by satellites. Although the RAIM technique 
represents the first example of integrity monitoring, it is able to detect only local errors 
made at the receiver level. The integrity monitoring applied by EGNOS could instead be 
seen as the forerunner of the Galileo system. Even if there are many differences in the 
definition of integrity for the two systems, the aim is the same for both: to protect the user 
against the failure of the system, warning him in the shortest time and with the greatest 
precision possible. 
The integrity of a navigation system can be defined as follows: “integrity relates to the trust 
that can be placed in the correctness of information supplied by a navigation system. 
Specifically, a navigation system is required to deliver an alarm when the error in the 
derived user position solution exceeds an allowable level (alarm limit). This warning must 
be issued to the user within a given period of time (time-to-alarm) and with a given 
probability (integrity risk)” (Oehler et al., 2004). 
In the near future a central role will be played by the integrity receiver’s capability. This 
service can be considered essential in the safety critical application domain, particularly in 
aviation. For these applications, the system’s capability of protecting the user against system 
failure is of primary importance.  
Integrity includes the system’s ability to supply, at the right time, reliable warnings to the 
user (alarm). The main problem with this service is how to determine what can be 
considered safe. This depends on the requirements of the different fields of application. The 
following parameters are traditionally used to define the safety of the service for a specific 
application: 
• Alarm Limit (AL): the maximum error allowed in the position domain before an alarm 
is generated.  
• Time To Alarm (TTA): the time that elapses between an error’s overcoming of the AL 
and the reception of the alarm by the user’s receiver.  
• Integrity Risk (IR): the probability that the alarm will not be delivered within the TTA.  
Allowable values of AL, TTA and IR depend on the specific application of the navigation 
system. The Galileo system provides a high level of integrity of the navigation signal. The 
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global integrity concept is the answer to the needs of different types of users who are all 
looking for different services in terms of signal and performance. 
A new concept of Integrity will be introduced in the following paragraphs. In particular, 
starting from the Galileo Integrity concepts, we will illustrate a few solutions to the integrity 
problem and describe a new one, in which data of different constellations (GPS/EGNOS 
and Galileo) are combined in order to improve the accuracy and the availability of the 
navigation data. 
2. Galileo integrity 
The integrity concept developed in Galileo has the aim of ensuring the correct computation 
of the user’s position and provide a valid alarm to the user if the error in the position 
solution has exceeded a fixed threshold - the Alert Limit - relative to the specific application 
(Martini, 2006). The user can be in one of the following conditions (Table 1): 
Case System Case System State 
System 
Alert for 
Satellite 
Satellite User 
Msg. 
Comment 
1 Fault-Free Nominal NO OK  
2 Fault-Free Nominal YES NOT-OK False Alert 
3 Faulty Non-nominal YES NOT-OK True Alert 
4b Faulty Non-nominal YES NOT-Monitored True Alert 
4c Faulty Non-nominal NO OK 
Error below 
Threshold 
Table 1. Examples of integrity 
In order to estimate all the errors that might occur in different situations, we have adopted a 
Gaussian model (J. Rife et al., 2004), whose standard deviation derives from the standard 
deviation of the error distribution and from the accuracy of the system. Moreover, each 
Gaussian distribution might have a bias, representing the presence of a faulty condition. The 
following Figure (Figure 1) shows the system’s estimate of the error distribution, illustrating 
the situations displayed in Table 1. The first two cases concern a faulty free condition: the 
error is modelled with a zero-mean Gaussian distribution. In this case, the system only has 
an estimation of the error. This estimation could be considered as a sample of the above-
mentioned Gaussian distribution, and this sample could be above (1) or below (2) the 
specific threshold. In case 1, the system is working in nominal condition, whereas case 2 
concerns a False Alarm condition. The failure is modelled as the presence of a bias in the 
error distribution. This bias could be higher than the threshold (case 3), and in that case the 
system would certainly detect it. 
Otherwise, the mentioned bias could be higher than the threshold, but the sample of the 
distribution could be below this limit (case 4). This case is referred as Missed Detection 
condition (Martini, 2006). 
The Galileo system provides three elements to preserve user integrity: 
• Signal-in-Space Accuracy (SISA): this is the expectation of the errors relative to the SW’s 
clock and ephemerides, based on long term observations. 
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• Integrity Flags (IF): this is a warning relative to a satellite that is transmitting a signal 
with an excessive error. IF is based on the short term observation of the clock’s 
variations, the ephemerides and the RF signals. 
• Signal-in-Space Monitoring Accuracy (SISMA): this is an estimation of the accuracy of 
the Signal-in-Space Error (SISE). 
3
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Fig. 1. Integrity events 
Using the parameters described above, the user could check the integrity, as follows: 
• In a faulty free condition, SISA overbounds the SISE distribution. 
• SWs set as NOT OK or NOT MONITORED are discarded from the position computation. 
• The user receiver computes the Protection Level using SISA and SISMA parameters. 
• PL is compared with the specific AL. 
2.1 Faulty free protection level 
The Galileo Integrity system is based on the concept of Protection Level. Its main purpose is 
to calculate the error’s bound in the position estimate, in order to be able to control this error 
with a sufficient level of confidence.  
The user receiver judges the accuracy of the computed position solution, typically in term of 
Horizontal Protection Level (HPL) and Vertical Protection Level (VPL), by means of an 
estimate of the system errors, an estimate of the local errors and the knowledge of the 
number and geometry of the SWs used for the positioning algorithm. The computed 
Protection Level is then compared with a specific Alert Limit, in order to determine the 
availability of the navigation service. 
The original definition of integrity belongs to the position domain, but it can be translated 
into the Signal-in-Space domain. As a matter of fact, the position error can be replaced by 
the SISE and the Protection level by the SISA.  
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2.2 Faulty case 
In case of a system failure, the range measurement will be affected by a bias that gets added 
to the other errors. The aim of the system is to detect this bias. For this reason the Galileo 
system consists of a Ground Segment (GSS) that is able to monitor range measurements. If 
the bias exceeds an established integrity threshold, the user will become aware of this via an 
alarm. 
The error detected by the ground segment can be modelled using a zero-mean Gaussian 
distribution with variance 2σ . Since the false alarm probability can be considered as the 
area limited by this function between threshold and infinite, we can calculate this threshold 
as follows: 
 2 2,fa SISA u LTH k σ σ= ⋅ +  (1) 
where fak  derives from the false alarm probability. 
The alarm is notified by setting the Integrity Flag relative to the satellite with failure in the 
information delivered to the users. This satellite must not then be considered by the user in 
the xPL computation and in the positioning algorithm. The combination between the IF and 
the PL can ensure the integrity of the information received in the position domain. 
Moreover, the implementation of a RAIM algorithm comes to the aid of the integrity 
monitoring, in order to face up to errors caused by local effects (i.e., multipath, interference, 
jamming and ionospheric effects). 
2.3 Evolution of integrity concept 
The evolution of the Galileo integrity concept concerns only the verification of system 
integrity. In particular, based on the above-mentioned definitions, the checking 
methodology has been modified: the vertical and the horizontal protection levels have been 
combined in a unique concept, and the user has to compute a probability, named Hazardous 
Misleading Information Probability (PHMI), which will be compared to the threshold. Once 
the distribution of the error in the desired reference frame is known (Gaussian 
overbounding distributions with SISA and SISMA), it will be simple to derive the associated 
integrity risk both in the faulty and the faulty free conditions appointed to the user 
equations. Therefore, the error distributions for the vertical (one dimensional Gaussian 
distribution) and horizontal (Chi Squared distribution with two degrees of freedom) cases 
need to be derived, and the corresponding integrity risk can be easily computed by 
analyzing the integral for both distributions with the given alert limits. The integrity risk at 
the alert limits VAL and HAL are finally computed by adding the vertical and horizontal 
contributions (Dore & Calamia, 2009). 
2.4 Galileo integrity risk 
Based on the aforementioned quantities (SISE, SISA, SISMA, IF and TH), the user receiver 
can derive the integrity risk for the user position solution. This integrity risk is always 
computed for a given alert limit. Whenever the derived IR at the AL is larger than the 
allowed IR, the user equipment will raise an alert (Oehler et al., 2004). 
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The assumptions made for the derivation of the user integrity equation are summarized as 
follows: 
• In a Faulty Free mode, the true SISE for a satellite is zero mean Gaussian distributed 
with standard deviation SISA. 
• In general, a faulty satellite will be flagged as Don’t Use. 
• For each instance in time, one satellite of those flagged as OK is considered to be faulty 
but not detected (Faulty Mode). The distribution for the SISE of a faulty satellite is 
Gaussian with an expectation value TH and a standard deviation SISMA. 
Once the distribution of the error in the reference frame is known (Gaussian overbounding 
distribution with SISA and SISMA respectively), the derivation of the associate integrity risk 
is straightforward. 
Therefore, the error distribution for the vertical (one dimensional Gaussian distribution) and 
horizontal (Chi Squared distribution with two degree of freedom) cases needs to be derived, 
and the corresponding integrity risk can be easily computed by analyzing the integral for 
both distributions with respect to the given alert limit. Finally, the integrity risk at the alert 
limits HAL (Horizontal) and VAL (vertical) are computed by adding the vertical and 
horizontal contributions (Oehler et al., 2004). 
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 (2) 
where N is the number of satellites used for the positioning algorithm.  
The Integrity Risk computed by the user represents the probability of exceeding the 
specified alert limits, since the system works according to the hypothesis described above. 
The Integrity Risk guaranteed by Galileo is partially allocated to user computation and 
partially to the system itself. This means that a proper design and implementation of the 
system must guarantee that the system have a sufficiently low probability of being in a 
condition in which the performance relevant assumption is no longer valid. Only this will 
ensure that the true overall integrity risk is below the required limit, in accordance with the 
specified level of service when this service is declared available by the integrity system. 
2.5 HMI probability computation algorithm (HPCA) 
In order to better understand the PHMI formula (Eq. 2) and all the elements contributing to its 
design, it is necessary to show the main passages leading to the construction of that 
equation. These passages could be collected into an algorithm leading to the HPCA 
algorithm (HMI Probability Computation Algorithm) (Luongo et al., 2004).  
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The objective of HPCA is to compute the predicted HMI probability in any integrity 
exposure time interval (150 s) for a given GMS integrity by monitoring state and user 
geometry.  
This algorithm includes the following modules: 
• UERE Computation Module 
• Position Solution Matrix Computation Module 
• Fault Free Position Error Computation Module 
• Faulty Position Error Computation Module 
• HMI Probability Computation Module 
Figure 2 shows the block diagram of the HPCA Algorithm. 
 Obtain Geometry
and Integrity Data
UERE Computation
   Position Solution
Matrix Computation
 FaultFree Position
Error Computation
      Faulty
Position Error
 Computation
HMI Probability Computation
         Set
HPCA_index
 
Fig. 2. HPCA algorithm 
The “UERE Computation module” computes the predicted standard deviation of total 
pseudorange error on each signal from visible satellites. The principal formula is as follows: 
 [ ] [ ] [ ]2 2, ,u RX SISA u Li i iσ σ σ= +  (3) 
It takes into account the signal in space as well as the local errors.  
[ ]SISA iσ  is the SISA value for the ith satellite used at user level; it is equal to the SISA value 
broadcasted in the navigation message increased by a factor of 1.1. 
 [ ] [ ]( )22 1.1SISA i SISA iσ = ⋅  (4) 
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[ ],u L iσ  is the predicted standard deviation of the local errors (troposphere, noise, multipath) 
on the ith signal. The values of the standard deviation of local errors can be read in the UERE 
table (Galileo satellites). Typical values are those reported in the following Table (F. Luongo 
et al., 2004). The computation is performed using the following interpolation function: 
 10, ( )
iEL
u L i a b eσ − ⋅= + ⋅  (5) 
Where A is a matrix that depends on the elevation angles, iσ  is the standard deviation 
value of the UERE for the ith satellite, while a and b can be computed by the following 
equation: 
 1( )
T T T
iab A A A σ−= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅  (6) 
ID 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 
Elevation [rad] 0.1745 0.2618 0.3491 0.5236 0.6981 0.8727 1.0472 1.5708 
σi [m] 1.0300 0.7800 0.6700 0.6000 0.5800 0.5700 0.5600 0.5500 
Table 2. UERE table 
The predicted standard deviation of total pseudorange error ( ,u RXσ ) is considered an 
internal variable of the HMI Probability Computation Algorithm (HPCA). 
The “Position Solution Matrix” module computes the position solution matrix. The main 
formula is reported: 
 ( ) 1T TK G WG G W−=  (7) 
where K is the Position Solution Matrix, G is the Observation Matrix and W is the Weighting 
Matrix obtained by inverting the Covariance Matrix. 
The “Fault Free Position Error” module computes the characteristic of the position error in 
fault free mode (fault free geometry: all the useable satellites). In particular, it evaluates the 
standard deviation of the distribution that overbounds the vertical position error and the 
variance of the distribution that overbounds the horizontal position error. The principal 
formulas are reported as follows: 
 2V ZZσ σ=  (8) 
 
22 2 2 2
2 4
2 2
XX YY XX YY
H XY
σ σ σ σξ σ⎛ ⎞+ −= + +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (9) 
where Vσ  is the standard deviation of the model (zero-mean normal CDF) used to 
overbound the vertical position error in fault free mode. 
2
Hξ  is the variance of the model used to overbound the horizontal position error (along the 
semi-mayor axis of the error ellipse) in fault free mode. 
The ,m nσ  components are obtained using this general expression: 
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 [ ] [ ] [ ]2, ,
1
, ,
N
m n u RX
i
K m i K n i iσ σ
=
= ⋅ ⋅∑  (10) 
where “i” indicates the ith satellite, “m” and “n” the reference axis: X, Y or Z. 
The “Faulty Position Error” module computes the characteristic of the position error in 
faulty mode (faulty geometry: one single failure satellite). In particular, the standard 
deviation of the distribution that overbounds the vertical position error and the variance of 
the distribution that overbounds the horizontal position error are computed. The principal 
formulas are reported here: 
 2 _V ZZ Fσ σ=  (11) 
 
22 2 2 2
_ _ _ _2 4
_
2 2
XX F YY F XX F YY F
H XY F
σ σ σ σξ σ⎛ ⎞+ −= + +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (12) 
where Vσ  is the standard deviation of the model (zero-mean normal CDF) used to 
overbound the vertical position error in faulty mode. 
2
Hξ  is the variance of the model used to overbound the horizontal position error (along the 
semi-mayor axis of the error ellipse) in faulty mode. 
The , _m n Fσ  components are obtained using the following general expression: 
 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]( )2 2 2, _ , 0 0 0 0
1
, , , ,
N
m n F u RX SISMA SISA
i
K m i K n i i K m i K n i i iσ σ σ σ
=
= ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ −∑  (13) 
where “i” indicates the ith satellite, “m” and “n” the reference axis: X, Y or Z. 
The “HMI Probability” module computes the probability of HMI. The principal formulas 
are reported as follows: 
 , ,HMI HMI Fault Free fail HMI FaultyP P p P−= +  (14) 
 , , , , ,HMI Fault Free HMI Fault Free V HMI Fault Free HP P P− − −= +  (15) 
 , , , , ,HMI Faulty HMI Faulty V HMI Faulty HP P P= +  (16) 
3. EGNOS integrity 
The GPS system is neither accurate nor reliable enough to be accepted as the only 
instrument of navigation for critical applications. One of the reasons is that no reliable and 
quick (within seconds) information can reach the user if any problems with the system 
occur. As a consequence, the GPS system cannot be used for landing approaches, for 
instance. Airplanes still have to use ILS-systems (Instrument Landing Systems) in case of 
poor visibility. But the installation and the maintenance of ILS-systems in every airport is 
expensive. With the SBAS systems, CAT I approaches (limited visibility) will be possible 
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without additional ILS systems. For CAT III approaches (zero visibility), even the SBAS will 
not suffice, and ILS is still required. 
EGNOS provides a European-wide, standardized and quality-assured augmentation service 
suitable for different fields of applications. Integrity is a key quality and safety parameter, 
and it alerts users when the system exceeds tolerance limits. EGNOS broadcasts wide-area 
differential corrections to improve accuracy, and alerts users within six seconds if something 
goes wrong (integrity).  
The receiver combines satellite/user geometry information, with EGNOS-corrected pseudo-
ranges, and internal estimates of the tropospheric delay to compute the user position. 
Ideally, the user would like to have the difference between the computed position and the 
true position - the true position error (PE) - to be less than the AL. However, since the true 
position is not known, the PE cannot be determined, and an alternative approach is 
required.  
In fact, the receiver continuously estimates a predicted position error, known as the 
protection level (PL), for each position solution. The PL can be estimated using the UDRE 
and GIVE parameters and other local error-bound estimates. It is scaled for compatibility 
with the probability of non-integrity detection so that the PL should always be larger than 
PE. 
Integrity assessments are based on PL and AL. A new PL is estimated for each computed 
position solution, then it is compared with the required AL, and an integrity alert is 
triggered if PL>AL. There is an underlying assumption, that PL>PE, when assessing 
integrity, and this corresponds to the “safe” zone to the left of the leading diagonal in Figure 
3. In the nominal operation case, PL<AL and the system is available. If PL>AL for a 
particular operation, the EGNOS integrity cannot support the operation, and the system is 
unavailable. 
There is also an “unsafe” zone to the right of the leading diagonal where PL<PE and the 
integrity assessment provide misleading information (Figure 3). The case at the bottom left 
corner of the diagram (PL<PE<AL) is also “safe,” theoretically, because the AL has not been 
exceeded, but it should be noted that EGNOS also protects against these out-of-tolerance 
situations (ESA, 2005). 
Different parameters, used in the XPL computation, must be elaborated by the ground 
segment (Roturier et al., 2001):  
• the variance σ2UDRE,i of a zero-mean normal distribution that describes the user 
differential range error (UDRE) for each ranging source after the application of fast and 
long-term corrections and excluding atmospheric effects and receiver errors; 
• the variance σ2UIRE,i of a zero-mean normal distribution that describes the L1 residual 
user ionospheric range error (UIRE) for each ranging source after ionospheric 
corrections have been applied. This variance is determined from the variance ( 2 ,GIVE iσ ) 
of an ionospheric model based on the broadcast grid ionospheric vertical error (GIVE).  
• the variance 2 ,local iσ  of a zero-mean normal distribution that relates the pseudo range 
error due to local receiver noise and multipath;  
• the variance 2 ,tropo iσ  of a zero-mean normal distribution that defines the residual pseudo 
range error of a tropospheric correction model. 
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Fig. 3. EGNOS protection level 
Assuming that the error in the range domain can be overbounded by a zero-mean Gaussian 
probability density function, the variance of that distribution is: 
 2 2 2 2 2, , , ,i i flt UiRE i air i tropo iσ σ σ σ σ= + + +  (17) 
where the variance 2,i fltσ  may be easily derived from 2 ,UDRE iσ . From Eq. (17) and for a given 
user/satellite geometry, it is quite simple to derive the vertical (horizontal) protection level 
VPL (HPL) equation by: 
1. passing from the pseudo range variance domain to the position variance domain, 
noting that the integrity definitions are all in the position domain; 
2. scaling the position domain variance to the integrity requirement. VPL (HPL) is scaled 
for compatibility with the probability of non integrity detection so that the VPL (HPL) 
should always be larger than PE. 
Compared to the first step, the variance in the position domain residual error is a linear 
combination of σ2i and is also representative of a zero-mean normal law. 
 2 2 2
,
1
N
Vposition V i i
i
sσ σ
=
=∑  (18) 
where SV,i are geometrical parameters.  
The second step is achieved by multiplying the position domain variance by a factor k that 
propagates this variance to a level compatible with the integrity requirement. 
 2 2
,
0
N
EGNOS V V i i
i
VPL K s σ
=
= ∑  (19) 
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Integrity assessments are based on XPL and XAL: a new XPL is estimated for each 
computed position solution. It is compared with the required XAL, and an integrity alert is 
triggered if XPL > XAL. 
4. RAIM integrity 
The integrity of a navigation system can be checked by using external systems such as SBAS 
to monitor the correctness of the signals used to calculate position. One of the main 
drawbacks to this approach is the inherent delay that is introduced when an error is 
detected, due to the time taken to uplink the information on errors. This section will focus 
on internal monitoring, and in particular on RAIM. RAIM stands for Receiver Autonomous 
Integrity Monitoring and is used to denote a monitoring algorithm that uses nothing but the 
measurements of one particular navigation subsystem, usually a GPS receiver. Conventional 
RAIM algorithms are designed to protect users from a single satellite failure at a time. 
However, recent developments have shown that RAIM has the potential to provide integrity 
even in case of multiple failures for challenging flight categories such as LPV-200 and APV-
II (Ciollaro, 2009).  
Measurement information is used to compute a position. A test statistic is derived from this 
position computation. It gets passed to an error detector that will warn the user whenever 
something is wrong. The error detection procedure will have to obey navigation 
requirements, and it is important to determine the detection power (or ‘error detectability’). 
It depends on the measurement quality and the configuration, and it is this detection power 
computation that monitors the system’s integrity, determining whether the system has the 
ability to provide timely warnings when the system is in error. If this is not the case, it will 
inform the user that it might be unsafe to use the system. It should be noted that position 
computation algorithms always assume that noise on the measurements has a zero mean. 
An error or bias, as it is commonly called, is therefore defined as the non-zero mean of 
measurement noise. 
4.1 Satellite slope 
The slope, which relates the induced position error to the test statistic, can be calculated 
directly from geometry and is different for each satellite. The satellite with the largest slope 
is the most difficult to detect. It produces the largest position error for a given test statistic 
(Figure 4) (Ciollaro, 2009). 
 
Fig. 4. Satellite slope 
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The slope is a geometric parameter that can be directly computed from the specific satellite-
user geometry, based on the following equations, in the horizontal and vertical planes 
respectively: 
 
2 2
1 2
1
i i i
i
ii
K K
Hslope
P
σ+= −  (20) 
 3
1
i i
i
ii
K
Vslope
P
σ= −  (21) 
where 1( )T TK G W G G W−= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅  is the weighted pseudo-inverse of the design matrix, where 
W the inverse of the covariance matrix, while P G K= ⋅ . The geometric contribution to the 
slope is given by the K and P matrices. 
4.2 RAIM protection levels 
The Protection Levels in the vertical and horizontal planes can be described by the following 
equations (Walter & Enge, 1995), for the vertical and horizontal cases, respectively: 
 max{ } ( , ) ( )FD slope fa md VVPL V T N P k P σ= +  (22) 
 max{ } ( , ) ( )FD slope fa md HHPL H T N P k P σ= +  (23) 
where: 
• Vslope and Hslope are the satellite error slope in the vertical and horizontal planes 
• T(N,Pfa) is the test statistic threshold, and it is a function of the number of satellites (N) 
and the desired probability of false alarm (Pfa). Given the probability of false alarms, the 
threshold can be found by inverting the incomplete gamma function: 
 
2
1
0
1
1
( )
T s a
faP e s ds
aΓ
− −− = ∫  (24) 
where a is the number of degrees of freedom divided by two, or, in terms of the number of 
measurements N and unknowns M: 
 
2
N M
a
−=  (25) 
• k(PMD) is the number of standard deviations corresponding to the specified Probability 
of Missed Detection. The smaller the PMD value, the higher the number of standard 
deviations should be considered, since longer tails for the Gaussian distribution should 
be taken into account. 
• Vσ  and Hσ  are the standard deviations of the error in the position domain in the 
vertical and horizontal planes. 
It should be noted that, when using RAIM, it is common to allocate the whole Integrity Risk, 
and so the whole Pmd is confined to only one plane (vertical or horizontal) according to the 
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specific operation. For example, for LPV-200, the whole Integrity Risk is allocated to the 
vertical domain, since this is the most demanding requirement. 
4.3 RAIM tst statistic 
It is not possible to obtain a direct measurement of the position error. Therefore, the overall 
consistency of the solution has to be investigated (Walter & Enge, 1995). As long as there are 
more than four measurements, the system is overdetermined and cannot be solved 
accurately. This is why a least squares solution is performed in the first place. Since all of the 
conditions cannot be met realistically and exactly, there is always an error residual to the fit. 
Therefore, we need to be able to estimate the fit and assume that, if there is a good fit, the 
position error is most likely small.  
An estimate of the ranging errors from the least squares fit and the basic measurement 
equation is given by: 
 ( ) ( )wls wlsy G x I G K y I P yε = − ⋅ = − ⋅ ⋅ = − ⋅  (26) 
where: 
 1( )T TP G K G G W G G W−= ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅  (27) 
From these error estimates it is possible to define a scalar measure, defined as the Weighted 
Sum of the Squared Errors (WSSE): 
 [( ) ] [( ) ]T Twls wlsWSSE W I P y W I P yε ε= ⋅ ⋅ = − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅  (28) 
which is equivalent to: 
 ( )TWSSE y W I P y= ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅  (29) 
The square root of WSSE plays the role of the basic observable, because it yields a linear 
relationship between a satellite bias error and the associated induced test statistic. The test 
statistic can be defined in both the horizontal and vertical planes. 
Typically, a certain threshold, which depends on the required probability of false alarm, is 
selected. If the statistic exceeds that threshold, then the position fix is assumed to be unsafe. 
On the other hand, if the statistic is below the threshold, then the position fix is assumed to 
be valid. 
The statistic-vertical error plane is thus broken up into four regions consisting of: normal 
operation points, missed detections, successful detections and false alarms. Ideally, there 
would never be any missed detections or false alarms. In reality, a certain number of missed 
detections and false alarms are allowed, based on the Pmd and Pfa requirements, respectively. 
5. Multisystem integrity 
With the advent of Galileo, users will be provided with multiple signals coming from 
different satellite systems. This will improve position accuracy, because the number of 
satellites in view per user will be almost doubled. Moreover, the higher measurements 
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redundancy will help guarantee a safer position and the detection of errors. This will also 
result in an improved availability as well as meet the requirements for more demanding 
flight categories. Therefore, it is necessary to introduce a base-line for a combined system, 
defining new parameters, a new integrity algorithm and possible ways to combine the two 
independent systems. 
With the term “Multisystem”, we intend the improvement of the accuracy and availability 
of the navigation solution using the combined Galileo and GPS signals. In this context, it is 
essential for the user to be able to take advantage of the integrity information coming from 
both Galileo and GPS satellite constellations, in order to prevent users from making errors 
that might represent an excessive risk. The multisystem integrity algorithm has to establish 
a link between the two generations of GNSS, defining the relation for integrating different 
integrity monitoring schemes (Pecchioni et al. 2007) (Ciollaro, 2009). 
5.1 Definition of a new integrity algorithm (EGNOS + Galileo) 
Two different approaches have been studied to define the new integrity algorithm. They 
represent two opposite ways of solving the problem of how to combine different integrity 
concepts: the first one has been called “One-System-Based Integrity,” and the second one 
“Parallel Integrity” (Dore & Calamia, 2009). 
The first approach is based on the use of only one algorithm for both systems with an a 
priori definition of integrity inputs. The integrity analysis can be made either by converting 
the EGNOS integrity message into an equivalent Galileo integrity message or vice versa, by 
using the inverse transformation from a Galileo to an EGNOS-like message. In the first case, 
known as Galileo-Based-Integrity-Algorithm (GBIA), the Galileo Integrity is used as a 
baseline; in the second case, called EGNOS-Based-Integrity-Algorithm (EBIA), the One-
System Integrity is the EGNOS algorithm.  
The second approach is based on the use of independent (parallel) algorithms, one for each 
System, and on an a posteriori integration of the integrity results. The integrity analysis can 
be performed by monitoring the values assumed by both the Integrity Risk and the 
Protection Level. If the IR is used as monitored variable, the scheme will be called IR-PIA; 
otherwise, if the monitored variable is the PL, the method will be called PL-PIA. It is worth 
noting that the computational load for the IR/PL conversion is expected to be higher than 
the PL/IR conversion, because an iterative method must be applied (Ciollaro, 2009). 
5.2 Galileo based integrity algorithm 
The approach chosen for this study is GBIA. The integrity data in fact arrives from the two 
systems, Galileo and EGNOS, and is implemented inside the Integrity Risk equation of 
Galileo, in order to estimate the HMI Probability. 
Figure 5 shows the block diagram of a GBIA system. The fundamental block of this diagram 
is the EGNOS/Galileo converter, which has the aim of converting the EGNOS Integrity 
message into a message that can be used by the Galileo Integrity Algorithm. 
The main functions implemented by the EGNOS-Galileo converter are the following 
(Ciollaro, 2009): 
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 , ,SISA GPS SISA GPS UDREfσ σ=  (30) 
 , ,SISMA GPS SISMA GPS UDREfσ σ=  (31) 
Taking into account the different integrity allocation between the Galileo concept, which 
implies the use of four failure mechanisms, and the EGNOS concept, based on a failure 
assumption, the contribution of the GPS satellite to IR computation is reduced only to the 
faulty free mode. 
Then it is possible to assume , 0SISMA GPSf =  and , 1SISA GPSf =  , that is: 
 ,SISA GPS UDREσ σ=  (32) 
Moreover, in order to estimate the standard deviation of the error, the following equation 
can be used: 
 2 2 2 2, , ( )u L GPS UIRE Air Tropoσ σ σ σ= + +  (33) 
  GPS
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Fig. 5. Galileo-based integrity algorithm 
5.3 Multisystem integrity (MSI) algorithm implementation 
In this section, we describe a new proposed multisystem integrity algorithm. The algorithm 
merges integrity data originated by the Galileo and EGNOS systems and employs a Receiver 
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Autonomous Integrity (RAIM) technique (Weighted RAIM). One of the potential uses of this 
algorithm consists in the combination of the IR algorithm with the RAIM technique. RAIM 
is able to detect failures that have not been detected by the IR algorithm. In case of multiple 
failures, when the WRAIM technique fails, the IR algorithm triggers an alarm. 
In this Section we describe the characteristics of this innovative algorithm, pointing out the 
reason for using the IR equation for the combined constellation Galileo/EGNOS and the 
reason for taking advantage of a RAIM technique. The EGNOS integrity equation provides a 
way to measure the integrity based on the incoming signal variances and the satellite 
geometry. The same is also true for the Galileo IR equation, obviously bearing in mind 
which data is the Galileo integrity data.  
This algorithm is supposed to enable the user to take advantage of the data transmitted by 
the Galileo and EGNOS systems: the user receiver must consider a single and large 
constellation in order to strengthen the positioning algorithm and improve the accuracy. 
This idea is simply in need of the definition of a new integrity concept, which would be able 
to combine the techniques mentioned above. 
5.3.1 IR equation 
First of all, we have to explain why the protection level concept turns into the integrity risk 
concept in a Galileo environment. In an EGNOS domain, IR is the probability that the 
horizontal (vertical) PL exceeds the horizontal (vertical) AL without the user receiving any 
alarm whatsoever. This definition requires a clear distinction between the horizontal and 
vertical cases. Therefore, it is necessary to split IR into two a priori fixed quantities. 
On the contrary, as far as a Galileo integrity equation is concerned, the users do not have to 
evaluate the horizontal and vertical protection levels, but the global IR directly, without 
making any strict allocations. In fact, different applications need distinct integrity 
requirements for the horizontal and vertical situations: for example, for a ship the vertical 
component of the error is not that important for a ship, but it is instead essential for a plane. 
This last observation leads us to choose the Galileo integrity equation to perform the 
multisystem integrity algorithm. 
The first step in the definition of a new integrity algorithm concerning a combined 
constellation (Galileo+GPS), is the characterization of the equivalent elements belonging to 
the two navigation systems. In order to perform the test on the position solution, we opted 
for the relationship between 2SISAσ  of Galileo and 2UDREσ  of EGNOS. First of all, these are 
quantities defined in the same domain SIS. Secondly, they are related to the same typology 
of error (clock and ephemeris). 
The local contribution to the variance of the error in the SIS depends on the elevation angles 
of the satellite belonging to the two constellations considered. As mentioned before, in order 
to consider a single constellation composed by both GPS and Galileo SW, we have 
considered the variance of the error in the SIS as follows: 
 2 2 2/ , , ,i SISA UDRE i u L iσ σ σ= +  (34) 
where the first term, in the case of an EGNOS satellite, derives from Eq. 32; the second term 
instead represents the local error contribution and can be estimated via the following equation: 
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 10, ,
iEl
u L i a b eσ −= + ⋅  (35) 
where a and b are parameters that depend directly on Eli (Luongo, 2004). This estimation 
was performed for both cases, the Galileo and GPS satellites. 
The IR equation has been implemented by means of a numerical code in a computer. FF and 
FM, in Eq. 2, suggest the faulty and faulty free modes. In fact, the Galileo system assumes 
two separate scenarios: one in which the satellites are all set as use, and the other in which 
one of the satellites set as use is supposed not to be functioning. When you are in the faulty 
mode, in the case of Galileo satellites, the SISMA element comes out; in an EGNOS case, 
only the faulty free mode is instead expected and, because we could not find an equivalent 
for the Galileo SISMA in its navigation message, we are going to consider the following 
situation: 
• Faulty free: for the Integrity Risk computation we consider all satellites in view, GPS 
and Galileo are set as OK.  
• Faulty mode: the involved satellites are only those belonging to the Galileo 
constellation; hence the index of the sum concerns only those satellites. 
5.3.2 Inputs of the implemented algorithm 
The information available a priori for the new algorithm consists of two text files containing 
position (X,Y and Z components) and velocity (X,Y and Z components) of the SV belonging 
to the two constellations considered, and obtained through a constellation simulator. 
Pseudoranges are obtained by the true satellite-user distance, adding a zero-mean Gaussian 
noise with variance depending on SISA and the elevation angles of the satellites. 
Regarding the SISA and SISMA evaluation, we have considered actual values, adding a 
Gaussian noise: 
 
( )
( )
0.87 0,
0.7 0,
SISA
SISMA
SISA N
SISMA N
σ
σ
= +
= +  (36) 
In this case, 0.01SISA SISMAσ σ= = , in order to simulate a sort of degradation on the signal 
received. We must also describe the behaviour of the positioning algorithm in the combined 
constellation case. Generally speaking, if we define Xk, Yk and Zk as the coordinates of the K-
th satellite and X, Y and Z as the coordinates of the user position, we are able to compute the 
distance between the satellite and the user ( kd ) and the pseudoranges ( kρ ) as follows 
(Misra & Enge, 2001): 
 2 2 2( ) ( ) ( )k k k kd X X Y Y Z Z= − + − + −  (37) 
and 
 ( ) ( ) ( )k k kc ud c t ρρ δ ε= + + #  (38) 
where: 
kρε : residual error on k-th satellite. b : clock’s offset. 
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Applying a linearization to the (38), we get the expression of the pseudo range model: 
 G X ρΔρ Δ ε= +  (39) 
The matrix G is named Design Matrix, and it consists of the linear coefficients obtained by 
the partial derivatives of the observation’s equations with respect to the estimated 
coordinates. This matrix characterizes the user-satellite geometry. The number of the 
columns of G agree with the number of unknowns to be determined (X,Y,Z and b), while the 
rows equal the number of the available observations (number of satellites in view for both 
navigation systems). The union of the Galileo and the GPS constellations causes a change in 
the G matrix. The number of unknowns in fact become five, in order to compute the clock’s 
offset for both systems. In order to estimate the user position’s ( ƒXΔ ) we have to apply the 
weighted least mean square method to the pseudo range model, organizing the weight 
matrix (W) with the information contained in the navigation message sent by EGNOS or by 
the Galileo satellites (considering only SWs in view, or those with an elevation angle greater 
than 10°): 
 ( )~ 1T TX G W G G WΔ Δρ−= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅  (40) 
where G and W are two matrices of dimension N×5 and N×N respectively, with N 
representing the number of the satellites used in the positioning algorithm.   
5.3.3 Outputs of the implemented algorithm 
In this Section we will describe the characteristics of the implemented multisystem integrity 
algorithm. We will discuss the results of a few simulation tests organized by different 
typologies (with or without failure) and different durations, in order to test the validity of 
the proposed algorithm and confirm the expected results.  
A peculiarity of this algorithm is the allocation of the Integrity Risk, valid for the 
computation of the HMIP , and the FAP  (False Alarm Probability), required to estimate the 
RAIM statistics. The false alarm probability of RAIM and the Integrity Risk of Galileo are 
related to the time required for a specific flight operation. For example, in the case of safety 
of life applications, this time is equal to 150 seconds. Our study refers to these applications. 
The proposed algorithm elaborates the position computation, the RAIM statistics and the IR 
equation in every second. It is therefore useful to refer to the probability mentioned above as 
to one second. In order to perform this conversion, we use the binomial distribution, 
obtaining the value of HMIP  and FAP , both initially set1 at 
70.5 10−× , referred to as one 
epoch (second). 
The failures have been reproduced in two different ways: 
• Introduction of a step function, at a given test epoch, on the pseudo range of a satellite 
in view. 
                                                 
1 Equally split between the two integrity requirements from the initial value of 71 10 / 150s−×  as defined 
by the ICAO for the avionic integrity requirements. 
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• Bias on SISA and SISMA. 
We chose the step function because it is able to characterize a lasting failure on a satellite. In 
fact, when we are looking at aeronautical applications, any failures lasting more than six 
seconds (TTA) are relevant. SISA results from the predictions on a satellite clock and 
ephemeris errors, and these error estimations are based on long term observations: SISA 
increases mark out long term failures. SISA derives from a large data batch, so the 
anomalous behaviour of just one sample is not relevant. On the other hand, pseudorange 
variations point out instantaneous failures. In case of failures, the new algorithm is able to 
protect users from:  
• long term bias due to errors from the clock and ephemeris data (IR equation);  
• long term bias and short term bias due to local errors (multipath, receiver noise) and 
errors caused by the SV, the SV payload and the navigation message (i.e. ephemeris 
data, clock) (RAIM algorithm). 
5.3.3.1 No failure mode 
In a “no failure” condition we are able to judge the behaviour of the new algorithm 
compared to the single constellation case, and we can also evaluate the performances 
offered by the code in term of probability of false alarm and missed detection. 
Figure 6 illustrates the RAIM statistic in normal operations (Vertical case), without failure, 
and the correct functioning of this part of the algorithm. In this case the RAIM algorithm has 
been simulated independently from the IR algorithm, in order to estimate how it behaves 
with many samples in an epoch.  
We tested the IR algorithm in the same way, for the two constellations and in absence of 
failures (Figure 7). 
Figures 6 and 7 show that the RAIM statistic presents some samples that exceed the 
threshold. In particular, these samples do not exceed the VPL (Vertical Protection Level), 
therefore they are in the False Alarm zone. This tells us that the RAIM statistic presents a 
low probability of triggering an alarm, whenever it is not necessary (the main reason for this 
behaviour of the WRAIM could be seen in the largest sensibility to the outliers of this 
integrity algorithm). Instead, the IR algorithm has a lower false alarm probability than the 
previous case, consequently to the fact that the threshold is never exceeded, and the system 
does not trigger any alarms when the SIS is not affected by any bias. 
5.3.3.2 Error on pseudoranges 
We simulated the local error by adding a bias (fixed value) to the pseudoranges. Our intent 
was to emulate the contribution of some types of errors (i.e. multipath) that are not present 
in the SIS transmitted (local errors) and consequently are not detectable by the ground 
segment of EGNOS or Galileo, but only by a RAIM technique. 
The pseudoranges are calculated by using the true distance between the satellites and the 
receiver, adding a Gaussian noise that depends on the variance 2iσ  (Eq. 34). In addition to 
the noise, in order to simulate the malfunctioning in the biased case, by a certain epoch we 
added a fixed value to the range measurement. Since the IR algorithm is not able to detect 
these kinds of errors, we present the results of the WRAIM part of the proposed algorithm 
for this first model of failure. 
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Fig. 6. WRAIM in faulty free condition 
 
Fig. 7. IR algorithm in faulty free condition 
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Figures 9 and 10 show how the RAIM statistic behaves in the presence of a bias of 20 meters 
inserted from the 30-th epoch in a satellite belonging to the Galileo constellation, and a bias 
of 10 meters, from the 50-th epoch, in a GPS satellite. In both cases the RAIM statistic (green 
and blue curves) exceeds the Test Statistic Threshold by a probability of 100%. The Figures 
show the instantaneous behaviour of the RAIM. This way of representing the RAIM process  
 
Fig. 8. RAIM and bias on pseudorange – satellite Galileo PRN 4 – RAIM algorithm 
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Fig. 9. RAIM and bias on pseudorange – satellite Galileo PRN 4 – Multisystem Integrity 
Algorithm 
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Fig. 10. RAIM and bias on pseudorange – satellite GPS PRN 8 
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Fig. 11. RAIM and bias on all pseudoranges 
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is not typical; in fact, in the example depicted in Figure 6, different samples of one epoch2 
are considered in order to obtain an estimate of the proper functioning of the algorithm. 
Figure 8 shows this kind of analysis made for the biased case (Galileo satellite, Vertical case). 
The RAIM technique clearly detects the error in the pseudorange; in fact, the ellipse of point 
leaves the normal operation region exceeding the TST. The same result can be achieved also 
in the GPS biased case. 
We can obtain different results by adding a bias on all pseudo ranges relative to all satellite 
in view. Through this kind of simulation we can reach the results shown in Figure 11. 
In Figure 11, the RAIM statistic remains around zero value: the receiver assigns the 10 
metres bias entirely to the two temporal unknowns, the GPS time clock’s offset and the 
Galileo time clock’s offset. 
In conclusion, we figured out that the RAIM statistic is not able to detect the failures on 
more than one satellite at the same time. This is a limit for this algorithm, which leads us to 
conclude that the RAIM algorithm does not work properly when used as single integrity 
system.  
5.3.3.3 Error on the SISA/SISMA value 
We simulated the error on the signal in space by adding a bias on the standard deviation of 
the noise considered in the SISA and SISMA computation of two random satellites 
belonging to one of the two constellations considered. In this failure mode, SISA and SISMA 
values have been implemented as in Eq. 36, assuming the following value for the respective 
standard deviation: 
 
10
7
SISA
SISMA
σ
σ
=
=  (41) 
Figure 12 shows the behaviour of the implemented algorithm, in particular the IR equation, 
when the bias on SISA and SISMA is considered in two Galileo satellites. In this case the 
algorithm triggers alarms with a probability of 2%. 
Comparing this with a single constellation case (only a Galileo satellite), Figure 13 shows the 
behaviour of the Integrity Risk algorithm in the Galileo case, considering the same size of 
bias for the same satellite. What is clear from this comparison is the decrease of alarms 
(~10%, in the second case) triggered by the system achieved by using the combined 
constellations. This means that in a dual constellation the combined system provides a safe 
position for the user. 
As described in the previous Section, since these disturbances are not related to a variation 
in the pseudoranges ( Δρ ), we are not able to detect those errors through the RAIM statistic. 
The trend of the statistics is similar to that in Figure 11, in which the curve never exceeds the 
Threshold; for the sake of brevity we didn’t report this picture. 
In conclusion, Figure 14 shows the behaviour of the described algorithm when the bias is 
applied to the SISA value belonging to two GPS satellites; in this case the biased SISMA is  
                                                 
2 the satellite configuration remains the same during the simulation; however, the noise added to the 
pseudoranges varies. 
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Fig. 12. IR algorithm combined constellation and bias on SISA and SISMA, satellites Galileo 
PRN15 and PRN22 
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Fig. 13. Galileo IR algorithm and bias on SISA and SISMA, satellites Galileo PRN15 and 
PRN22 
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not present because this quantity is not broadcasted by the GPS satellite and, as we stated 
previously, the integrity data delivered by these satellites does not alter the Faulty section of 
the HMIP  equation. For this reason, in this context, the above-mentioned probability does 
not reach high values. Indeed, the statistics never exceed the Threshold. 
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Fig. 14. IR algorithm combined constellation and bias on SISA, satellites GPS PRN3 and 
PRN10 
6. RAIM evolution: ARAIM 
An interesting development of the described study is the analysis of the new RAIM 
technique, the Advanced RAIM. ARAIM, proposed in 2010 by the GEAS (GNSS Evolutionary 
Architecture Study), could be considered as an evolution of the classical RAIM. This new 
solution takes advantage of the availability of different new navigation systems (i.e. Galileo) 
in order to improve receiver performances.  
ARAIM is an extension of the single-frequency RAIM. Both are based on an airborne 
comparison of each satellite measurement to the consensus of the other available satellite 
measurements (GEAS, 2010). However, the differences between the two techniques are  
also important. ARAIM should be pursued for the worldwide vertical guidance of civil 
aircraft based on two or more GNSS constellations radiating at two ARNS/RNSS 
frequencies (L1 and L5). The main characteristic of the Advanced RAIM would support 
vertical guidance to decision heights of 200 feet (LPV-200), whereas single-frequency RAIM 
only supports LNAV guidance. As such, ARAIM must protect vertical errors at levels of  
35 meters, while RAIM only needs to detect lateral errors of 200 meters or so. In addition, 
LPV-200 corresponds to a severe major hazard level (10-7), and LNAV is only major (10-5).  
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The proper functioning of this system does require some assistance from the ground; for 
example, the ISM (Integrity Support Message), which is a message developed using 
reference receivers on the ground, is communicated to the aircraft. The ISM message 
conveys the safety assertions associated with each of the underlying satellite systems to the 
sovereign responsible for a given airspace. These messages would contain performance 
estimates for each satellite to be used for navigation. ARAIM therefore uses a multiplicity of 
satellites in a dual-constellation environment to take responsibility for all faults that arise 
between dispatch and the completion of approach. 
As described in the previous Section, one of the potential uses of the Multisystem Integrity 
algorithm is represented by the combination of the IR algorithm with the RAIM technique. 
ARAIM is still in a feasibility status, and a comparison—in order to test and verify the 
requirements and highlight the differences between the two approaches—between its 
results and Multi System Integrity cannot yet be performed. Indeed, the two systems have 
the same aim: to improve the reliability of the position solution provided by the system in 
particular conditions (LPV-200 for ARAIM), taking advantage of different navigation 
systems.  
7. Conclusions 
The totality of the tests made on the implemented code has been planned with the aim of 
characterizing the performances of the algorithm respectively in faulty free and in faulty 
mode. The use of the Galileo and EGNOS system as a single and augmented constellation 
allows us to develop the positioning algorithm and improve the position accuracy. 
Furthermore, the combination of the two SVs systems enables us to obtain some benefits 
from the RAIM point of view. 
Our proposed solution starts from the integrity equation defined for the Galileo system and 
adapts it to the combined Galileo + EGNOS system, or rather, it combines the integrity data 
supplied separately by the two navigation systems, with the aim of computing the 
Hazardous Misleading Information Probability. We focused our attention on the IR 
equation: the implemented code reproduces the IR equation as it is presented in literature, 
that is, with the SISA values relative to Galileo and GPS satellites, and SISMA relative only 
to the Galileo ones, in faulty free and faulty mode, respectively. The results obtained testing 
the algorithm in the presence of failure have provided positive indications on the 
implemented IR equation: in these cases, the HMI probability increases with the value of the 
bias. 
Alhough the IR protects the user against extended failure, whose effects revert on the SISE 
estimation, the RAIM technique could instead highlight instantaneous errors on the 
distances measured by a Galileo or a GPS satellite. RAIM and IR compensate each other, or 
rather, the RAIM indicates failure unperceived by the IR and vice versa; therefore the 
combination of the RAIM technique with the integrity equation has proved to be a good 
idea. This technique is based on a very different concept than protection levels and leads to 
different results. However, the Galileo integrity concept is more complete than the 
GPS/SBAS and RAIM integrity concepts and offers more protection from failures. However, 
this concept needs to be investigated further, in particular regarding the assumptions to be 
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used for the error distributions and the parameters to be considered in the integrity 
equation. Indeed, although more complete, the new integrity concept introduced by Galileo 
is more complex and less intuitive than SBAS and RAIM protection level concept. 
A possible development of the proposed algorithm could be the definition of SISMA 
analogous for the GPS satellites in order to contribute to the IR equation under faulty 
conditions.  
The present study is only a preliminary analysis. In order to better evaluate the 
performances of the proposed algorithm, we need to use realistic data (i.e. pseudoranges 
measurements obtained through a real GNSS receiver) as inputs of the implemented code. 
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financed by the Italian Space Agency (ASI) under the contract DC-IPC-2006-160; 
• PEGASUS (Platform of Enhanced Gnss receiver for Application in Sol User Segment), 
December 2010 – December 2011, financed by the Italian Space Agency (ASI) under the 
contract. ASI I/024/10/0. 
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